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Scholar’s Privilege: A Normative Primer 
Ryan M. Rodenberg* and Anastasios Kaburakis** 
Professor Stanley Fish’s forthcoming book, Versions of Academic 
Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution, highlights the diverse topics 
and nuanced analyses in any thoughtful discussion of academic freedom.  
This commentary focuses on one such micro-issue under the umbrella of 
academic freedom – “scholar’s privilege.”  Specifically, we outline and 
posit on the freedom of academics not to disseminate their unpublished 
research, particularly when subject to a litigant’s subpoena. 
The foundation for scholar’s privilege is set forth in Rule 45 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1  The various subsections of the rule 
provide parameters on a variety of issues, including: (i) the duty to avoid 
undue burden;2 (ii) how to object to a subpoena;3 and (iii) the process to 
compel production or inspection.4  Rule 45(d)(3) is particularly important.  
It permits the court to quash or modify research-seeking subpoenas on the 
basis of time, travel, privilege, or general burdensomeness considerations.5 
A quartet of noteworthy cases has illustrated how courts view a claim 
of scholar’s privilege.  The First Circuit found data collected by two 
scholars to be privileged in Cusumano v. Microsoft.6  In Buchanan v. 
American Motors, the Sixth Circuit quashed a subpoena as unreasonably 
burdensome, explaining: 
Compliance with the subpoena would require the expert who has no 
direct connection with the litigation to spend many days testifying and 
disclosing all of the raw data, including thousands of documents, 
accumulated over the course of a long and detailed research study.  
Like the District Court, we note that the expert is not being called 
because of observations or knowledge concerning the facts of the 
accident and injury in litigation or because no other expert witnesses 
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1  FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
2  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1). 
3  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B). 
4  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). 
5  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A). 
6  Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Judith G. Shelling, A 
Scholar’s Privilege: In re Cusumano, 40 Jurimetrics J. 517 (2000). 
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are available.7 
Dow Chemical v. Allen granted protection for unpublished data, notes, 
and working papers.8  In contrast, in Wright v. Jeep, the judge compelled 
the non-party academic to provide the requested research concluding that 
the professor was a public figure, “yet wants to remain essentially 
anonymous so far as the administration of justice is concerned.”9 
The freedom to control the divulgence of one’s research is an 
important one.  Colleges and universities should memorialize their support 
for scholar’s privilege in one of two ways.  First, a general duty to provide 
legal counsel and expenses for professors asserting the privilege in court 
could be included in the applicable employment agreement with language 
analogous to that of an indemnity provision.  Second, in a context where 
collective bargaining agreements govern, a clause recognizing scholar’s 
privilege could be embedded therein with the union and/or management 
promising to support a professor’s claim of scholar’s privilege when 
asserted in a formal judicial proceeding after being served with a subpoena. 
In his new book, Professor Fish opines that an academic’s “job can be 
properly done only if it is undistorted by the interests of outside 
constituencies.”10  We agree.  A robust scholar’s privilege preserves a 
professor’s discretion as to the timing of research dissemination while 
simultaneously serving as a buffer against litigants seeking to (aggressively) 
compel production of academic work not yet in the public domain. 
 
 
7  Buchanan v. Am. Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983). 
8  Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982). 
9  Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 872 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
10 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
86 (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 86) (on file with FIU Law Review). 
